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Can a Central Bank Influence
Its Currency’s Real Value?
The Swiss Case
HE SWISS National Bank (SNI3) is one of
the few central banks that conducts monetary
policy by announcing and generally achieving a
targeted growth rate for the money stock.
Policy is conducted in this manner because SNB
officials, believing that excessive growth in the
money stock is the cause of inflation, have
established long-run price stability as the central
banks primary objective. Moreover, because
large, unexpected changes in money growth are
thought to create uncertainty that can raise real
interest rates and reduce output, SNB officials
believe the average rate of money growth not
only should be low (to achieve low inflation
rates) but stable as well.1 Thus, in Switzerland,
both rapid money growth and large, unexpected
changes in the money stock have been rare.
The historical evidence clearly indicates that
SNB actions have met their objectives: growth in
the monetary base since 1982, for example, has
been targeted at rates between 2 percent and 3
percent and has been, on average, 2.4 percent
over these seven years. The average rates of in-
flation and real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth over the same seven years have been
2.0 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.
Despite its commitment to money growth
targets, the SNB realizes Switzerland is a small
open economy that exports about 40 percent of
Gross National Product (GNP). Thus, domestic
real activity can be affected adversely by ap-
preciations of the Swiss franc that raise the real
price of Swiss goods to foreign buyers relative
to prices charged by competing foreign sup-
pliers. If, for example, Swiss exporters respond
to an exchange rate appreciation by reducing
Swiss franc prices (which will maintain the
foreign currency price of their goods), the
quantity of exports sold will not change but
their profit margins will shrink. On the other
hand, if exporters maintain current Swiss franc
prices, the prices paid by foreign buyers will
rise (because of the exchange rate appreciation)
and the quantity of exports sold will decline.2
These specific effects on Swiss exporters pose a
policy problem because, in the aggregate, they
are likely to cause some reduction in real GNP
growth.
1See, for example, the arguments put forth by Mascaro and
Meltzer (1983).
2Whether profits rise or tall will depend on the elasticity of
demand for exports. See Belongia and Hermann (1989) for
some estimates of the responsiveness of Swiss exports to
exchange rate changes.
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What makes the Swiss case interesting in this
context is that a central bank committed to
money growth targets and a low, stable infla-
tion rate made an abrupt, but temporary, policy
shift because of exchange rate pressures. Specif-
ically, the SNB abandoned its money growth
targets in 1978-79 in an attempt to reduce the
real value of the Swiss franc in foreign ex-
change markets and avert a recession.~As
figure 1 shows, the franc had appreciated
sharply both against the Deutschemark (DM)
and the dollar, which represent the two most
important currencies for Swiss trade. In
response to this currency appreciation, the
Swiss monetary base was expanded at an an-
nual rate of 95 percent between July 1978 and
January 1979.
The rapid money growth and exchange rate
movements shown in the figure provide a case
study to help answer the type of question faced
by many countries, including the United States,
in recent years: If the real value of a nation’s
currency has risen “too high,” over what time
horizon and by what amount can actions by the
central bank reduce the real exchange rate?4 In
this article, we use the Swiss experience over
the period of flexible exchange rates and some
orthodox results from economic theory to sug-
gest general conclusions about the effects of
monetary actions on the real exchange rate.
NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE
RATES
The real exchange rate is defined as the
nominal spot rate adjusted for price level
differences across countries. If purchasing
power parity (PPP) conditions were met con-
tinuously, the real exchange rate would be
constant. Because economic developments often
affect the nominal spot rate and price levels
across countries with different lags and in dif-
ferent ways, however, the real exchange rate
generally varies through time. Movements in
the real exchange rate, therefore, represent
those changes in the nominal rate that cannot
be attributed to inflation differentials. Specifical-
ly, changes in the real exchange rate reflect
structural changes in real economic perfor-
mance across countries.
Distinguishing between the real and nominal
exchange rate is crucial to any analysis of the
effects of exchange rate movements because on-
ly changes in a currency’s real value affect
trade flows. A change in the nominal exchange
rate alone will not affect trade flows; the poten-
tial benefits from importing Swiss goods due to
the decline in the franc’s nominal value will be
offset exactly by the higher prices for Swiss
goods that caused the nominal depreciation.5
Thus, if a central bank’s actions are intended to
influence trade flows — not simply to change
the relationship between foreign and domestic
price levels — the analysis must focus on what
happens to the real exchange rate.°Moreover,
because we are interested in how monetary ac-
tions might affect the real exchange rate, we
must examine economic models that permit cen-
tral bank actions to do so.
THEORETICAL MODELS OF
EXCHANGE RATE RESPONSES TO
MONETARY CHANGES
Establishing a relationship between changes in
the money stock and real economic magnitudes
produces some conflict among competing
economic theories. One class of models posits
different speeds of adjustment across markets
3See Rich and B~guelin (1985, p. 85) for a discussion of
this episode and, in particular, SNB reference to a
DMlSwiss franc exchange rate lower bound of 080 (their
footnote 9).
4Note that, in many respects, the Swiss debate parallels
that ofthe United States in the early 1980s. During that
period, analysts discussed the relationships between ex-
change rates and exports [see, for example, Batten and
Belongia (1986)) and the appropriate responses of both the
Federal Reserve and foreign central banks to a rising
dollar [see Batten and Kamphoefner (1982) and Batten
and Ott (1984)1. This attempt to change the level of the ex-
change rate is to be contrasted with efforts to reduce ex-
change rate volatility. Gartner (1987) offers some evidence
on the latter case for the SNB.
5Unless we are dealing in very special cases—such as a
world with indexed contracts or no unexpected price
changes—nominal exchange rate changes also will be
changes in the real exchange rate. For some simple ex-
positions of these relationships and the distinction between
real and nominal exchange rates, see Batten and Luttrelt
(1982) and Batten and Belongia (1986).
~Atleast two important issues are ignored from this
perspective. First, the rapid money growth associated with
the 1978-79 intervention was followed by a rapid increase
in the Swiss inflation rate. Second, Swiss importers and
consumers, who benefit from a higher exchange rate, will
be made worse off if the exchange rate declines. Thus, a
discussion of the net benefit of a lower exchange rate is
considerably more complicated than a narrow focus on the
welfare of Swiss exporters alone.
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Figure 1
Real Exchange Rate of the Swiss Francis, Swiss Franc/DM






in response to a monetary change. In this case,
real magnitudes can be affected by fully-
anticipated monetary changes because, say,
prices of financial assets react more quickly
than prices of durable goods and, as a conse-
quence, relative prices, output and other real
magnitudes may be affected in the short run.
Another class of models hypothesizes that fully
anticipated events will not affect real variables
because they already will incorporate these ex-
pectations into current values. Thus, only
“shocks” or “surprises” are allowed to affect real
magnitudes. Despite their particular differences,
however, models from both classes predict that
monetary changes will affect real variables only
temporarily.~We discuss specific models of each
type in the sections below.
Fully Anticipated Monetary
Changes: The Dornbusch Model
One model that relates exchange rate move-
ments to actual changes in the money stock is
the Dornbusch (1976) model of overshooting
real exchange rates. The model is derived for a
small country whose actions cannot affect the
world economy; moreover, it is assumed that
perfect capital mobility exists (that is, interest
rate parity holds continuously) and people form
expectations rationally. The model includes a
money market with a standard money demand
function and a market for domestic goods.
In the long run, this model assumes that ex-
change rates will be consistent with purchasing
7Note that this also implies trade will be affected, if at all,
only temporarily and after some lag.
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power parity. In the short run, however, the
possibility that exchange rates may overshoot
their long-run PPP values is introduced through
different speeds of adjustment in financial and
goods markets.
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of a monetary
change on the real exchange rate, e/P, (the price
of the foreign currency divided by the domestic
price level; the foreign price level is assumed to
be constant) and the domestic price level, P. At
all points on O~,the money market is in equilib-
rium, that is, interest rate parity holds. The
goods market equilibrium is represented by the
vertical line labeled PPP because, on this line,
purchasing power parity holds. Moreover, it is
assumed that the goods market equilibrium oc-
curs for a given real exchange rate. A monetary
expansion implies that Q0 shifts upward to Q,.
The new long-run equilibrium, at point C, is
given by the intersection of PPP and Q1 at the
same real exchange rate but a higher domestic
price level. This implies that an expansionary
monetary policy change does not affect real
variables in the long run.
The transition from the old to the new equi-
librium, however, does not take place through a
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate that
is exactly in line with increases both in the
domestic price level and the domestic nominal
interest rate. In the short run the money
market will dominate the goods market because
it reacts instantaneously to a monetary change
and finds its new equilibrium immediately. The
goods market, however, is out of equilibrium in
the short run because price adjustments lag and
the quantity of goods demanded exceeds quanti-
ty supplied at the existing price level.
This excess liquidity will cause short-term in-
terest rates to fall and, thus, will make the
domestic currency less attractive to hold. Fur-
thermore, investors know that the currency
must depreciate to restore an equilibrium be-
tween the goods market and money market.
Therefore, they will move to shift portfolios im-
mediately from domestic assets into foreign
assets - This portfolio shifting, induced by the ex-
cess supply of domestic currency, will cause
both nominal and real exchange rates to depre-
ciate until interest rate parity is reestablished.
At this intermediate stage of the adjustment
process, indicated by point B in figure 2,
domestic interest rates are below foreign in-
terest rates, and the domestic price level has
not yet adjusted. When the price level eventual-
ly does adjust, there is a movement along Q in
the figure toward the new long-term
equilibrium, C. At C, the nominal exchange rate
has depreciated but the real exchange rate has
returned to its initial value.
The mechanics of the Dornbusch model—
specifically, the initial adjustment from point A
to point B followed by the permanent, long-run
adjustment to point C—imply that the SNB can
influence real exchange rates in the short run
at the price of a temporary inflation. The model
also indicates that, in the long run, monetary
policy has no effect on real exchange rates.
Both conclusions are valid, however, only if
other central banks do not offset the measures
taken by the SNB. Overall, given certain simpli-
fying assumptions, the Dornbusch model offers
two testable propositions: Do monetary actions
cause changes in the real exchange rate and, if
so, over what period of time?
An Alternative Model of the Real
Exchange Rate: The Influence of
Unexpected Monetary Changes
Another strategy in modeling the real ex-
change rate, consistent with the earlier discus-
ppp
(e/P)0,1 e/P
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sion and following the asset approach to ex-
change rate determination, has been to focus on
unexpected changes in assorted macroeconomic
variables. In contrast to the Dornbusch model,
which allows actual differences between domes-
tic and foreign variables to have short-run real
effects through adjustment lags, other models
have focused on differences between actual and
expected values of explanatory variables in for-
eign and domestic economies. In this case, al-
though differences in the commodity market
and currency market adjustment processes still
may be important, the emphasis is directed
more to the influence of “surprises” on the ex-
change rate. Variables included, among others,
have been unexpected changes in the money
stock, the government budget surplus (or
deficit) and real GNP.
In each case, the variables for these models
were thought to determine or measure dif-
ferences in real activity across countries so that
an unexpected change in them would signal a
reassessment of real performance across coun-
tries and, hence, a reassessment of relative cur-
rency values. Despite their theoretical appeal,
however, models of this type have had limited
success in explaining substantial amounts of the
variation in real exchange rates. Surveys by
Bomhoff and Korteweg (1983) and Bomhoff
(1987) have provided economic and econometric
reasons to explain the decided empirical failures
of theoretical exchange rate equations.
For our interest in the narrow issue of SNB
monetary policy and the real exchange rate, a
model adopted by Hoopet- (1983) and Shafer and
Loopesko (1983) offers a straightforward ap-
proach. Starting with conditions of uncovered
interest parity and a long-run equilibrium cur-
rent account balance of zero, an expression for
the log of the real exchange rate (HER) can be
written as:
(1) RER = (r — it’) — (r* — ~~*) + aICAB,
where r and it’ denote the nominal interest rate
and expected inflation, respectively, * denotes a
foreign variable and aXCAB is the cumulative
current account balance. Thus, the log of the
real exchange rate is stated as a positive func-
tion of both the domestic-foreign real interest
differential and the cumulative current account
balance.
Equation 1 in its current form, however, is
not directly useful for our purposes because the
policy question applies to changes in the real ex-
change rate, not its level. Moreover, we are in-
terested only in the simple bivariate relationship
between monetary actions and exchange rate
changes. Finally, and perhaps most important,
equation 1, as written, has no specific reference
to monetary policy actions.
To apply equation I to the current investiga-
tion of monetary policy’s influence on the real
exchange rate, the CAB term was dropped and
the remaining terms were differenced so that
changes in the real exchange rate were related
to changes in the real interest differential.8
That is:
(2) ARER = A(r — it’) — A(r* —
After these simplifying assumptions and manip-
ulations, we have, in equation 2, reduced the
problem to one in which changes in either the
domestic or foreign real interest rates, or both,
cause a change in the real exchange rate.9
To allow a role for monetary policy actions in
equation 2, a long history of economic literature
suggests that unexpected changes in money
growth can affect the real interest rate, at least
temporarily, by altering inflationary expecta-
tions or through a liquidity effect. Moreover, if
equation 2 is a generally correct expression for
the real exchange rate, an announced, credible
policy by the SNB to increase money growth to
reduce the franc’s real value should have no ef-
fect because rational agents will incorporate the
information into revised expectations for higher
future inflation and, as a consequence, higher
nominal interest rates and a lower nominal ex-
change rate. But, with all nominal magnitudes
adjusting by the exact amounts and without
lags, there is no latitude for a temporary
change in the real exchange rate.
Because this second model suggests that fully
anticipated monetary policy actions will leave
8Dropping this variable isjustified on two grounds. First,
the Swiss current account balance has been nearly cons-
tant over time such that variations in it are unlikely to be
an important source of exchange rate fluctuations. The se-
cond reason is the theoretical result that it is a persistent
change in CAB — not its level — which will affect the real
exchange rate. For a discussion of this independence
of a stable CAB level and the exchange rate, see Mussa
(1985).
~Thisabstracts from the special case in which the domestic
and foreign rates change in a way that leaves the differen-
tial unchanged.
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the real interest differential and, hence, the real
exchange rate unaffected, equation 2 suggests
that a successful attempt by the SNB to reduce
the franc’s real value must be both unantic-
ipated and not offset by the actions of other
central banks. Whether the predictions of either
model are supported by the data is investigated
in the next section.
EMPIRICAL ADAPTATION
Because the sole question of interest is wheth-
er monetary actions, however measured, affect
the real exchange rate, we did not attempt to
estimate structural equations derived from
either of the theoretical models discussed
earlier. Instead, we chose to examine statistical
tests that indicate whether monetary actions
“cause” a change in the real exchange rate.’°
Moreover, because Swiss monetary actions that,
ceteris paribus, would affect the real exchange
rate may be offset by actions of other central
banks, our causality tests were estimated based
on differences between changes in the growth
rates of the monetary base across countries.
The general form of the equations estimated
for these tests is depicted as:
(3) AftER, = a +~ + c~ARER,~~ +
i=o j=1
where HER is the real Swiss franc/DM or Swiss
franc/dollar exchange rate, B is a measure of
relative monetary actions, a, b and c~are coeffi-
cients to be estimated and ~, is a random error
term. Lag lengths for the explanatory variables,
p and q, were chosen by a final prediction er-
ror (FPE) criterion.” The real exchange rates
used are monthly averages of the Swiss
franc/dollar and Swiss franc/DM nominal rates
adjusted by ratios of the respective countries’
consumer price indexes. The monetary base
was chosen as the basic measure of monetary
actions in all three countries. By allowing con-
temporaneous values of monetary actions to
enter these regressions, we explicifly assume
that monetary policy decisions are exogenous.
To test the Dornbusch model, the B variable
in equation 3 was measured as the difference
between Swiss and German or Swiss and U.S.
monetary base growth rates. For the second
model, measures of unexpected changes in the
base growth rates were needed. In fact, the
relationships discussed earlier indicated that B
should be represented as the difference be-
tween Swiss and German or Swiss and U.S.
monetary surprises. To construct these meas-
ures, second differences of logarithms were
used to represent unanticipated changes in each
individual monetary base series. Then these in-
dividual series were used to construct the dif-
ferences between Swiss and German or Swiss
and u.S. monetary policy surprises.12
The relationships described by equation 3
were estimated with monthly data over a
1973-86 sample period; the results are shown in
table I. Section A of the table, based on dif-
ferences between actual growth rates of the
monetary base across countries, indicates a
marginally significant effect of monetary actions
on the real Swiss franc exchange rate. The FPE
criterion, picked only contemporaneous
measures of monetary actions as the best
representation of the model in the U.S. case; for
the German case, contemporaneous and two
lagged values of relative monetary actions were
chosen.” Although this variable was marginally
significant in the U.S. case, the sign of the
estimated coefficient for relative monetary ac-
tions is incorrect. Since theory suggests a
positive response for this specification of the
data, (relatively faster Swiss money growth will
increase the number of Swiss francs per dollar)
the negative sign in the U.S. case is puzzling.
For the German case, the estimated coefficients
‘°SeeJacobs, et al. (1979) for some of the more common
critiques of causality testing. Also see Zellner (1979) for a
more general discussion of causality tests and their ap-
plication. Although Fratianni, et al. (1987) apply this testing
procedure to the money-exchange rate relationship, their
study does not include the Swiss franc and uses the
nominal, rather than real, exchange rate.
“See, for example, Batten and Thornton (1985).
“These measures of unanticipated monetary changes
should be “white noise,” series whose movements cannot
be explained by their own past behavior or the behavior of
other variables. Tests for white noise indicated that the
second differences of logarithms of each country’s
monetary base series had this characteristic.
‘3An alternative would be to estimate models for a variety of
lag lengths and look for patterns in the results. This also
was done for all pairs of possible lags, up to 12 months,
for both the monetary variable and the exchange rate (144
regressions for each of the four equations reported). The
general finding was that significant effects of monetary
actions—whether actual or unanticipated—were found for
all lag pairs up to six months.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS53
Table 1
Estimated Relationships Between Monetary Actions and Changes in the
Real Swiss Franc Exchange Rate
A. The Effects of Actual Monetary Actions ~Bis specified as Mn SWMB - Mn USMB or Mn SWMB - Mn GEMB~




Swiss franc/DM: Mn flEA. = . 0.001 + 0043 (B,) — 0.036(B~.) + 0.149 (B. ) + 0449 Mn REP ., — 0.197 Mn REP.
(1 04) (0.99) (0.84) (3 48) (5.98) (2.60)
2
H 02 0
B. The Effects ofRelative Monetary Surprises (B is specified as AMn SWMB — AMn USMS or AMn SWMB — Mm GEMS)




Swiss franciUM: Mn PER. =- . 0.001 ÷ 0.015 (B.)— 0032 (B ) + 0.095 (B, ) + 0.080 (B. , ) + 0.460 Mn PER,
(1 39) (0.39) (0.70) (2.06) (2.07) (5.98)




NOTE AbsolUte values of t-slatistics are in parentheses
for the contemporaneous and last lag of the B
variable take the expected positive sign but only
the latter term is significantly different from
zero. In general, the conclusion seems to be
that differences between actual monetary
changes across countries have weak, short-lived
and unpredictable effects on the real exchange
rate,
Interpreting these inconsistent results is made
somewhat easier, however, by returning to
figure 1 and some points made earlier in the
paper. The figure shows that the large increase
in the Swiss monetary base during 1978-79 was
associated with temporary appreciations of both
the dollar and DM against the Swiss franc. This
relatively small and short-lived effect was
followed, however, by two distinctly different
paths for the dollar and DM against the Swiss
franc, with the dollar rising sharply until early
1985 and the DM returning to a path of small,
gradual depreciations. Also recall that the SNB
discussed its policy stance over this interval in
terms of a 0.8 lower bound for the Swiss
franc/DM exchange rate. The DM, of course,
dominated other currencies in SNB decisions
because Germany is Switzerland’s largest
trading partner. Overall, these bits and pieces of
evidence—the path for the Swiss franc/DM ex-
change rate in the figure, SNB policy statements
regarding a Swiss franc/DM objective, and the
“correct” sign for monetary actions in the Swiss
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franciuM equation—suggest that SNB actions
designed to reduce the franc’s real value did
have some weak effect relative to its target cur-
rency.14 That effect, however, was dissipated
quickly.
Section B of the table, which redefines the
monetary variable as the difference between
unanticipated monetary changes across coun-
tries, shows monetary effects that are more
strongly significant but still of puzzling signs.
The chosen lag lengths are relatively short, sug-
gesting the transitory nature of monetary ac-
tions on the real exchange rate.
Nonetheless, the general results again are prob-
lematic. Theory suggests that an unexpected in-
crease in Swiss base growth that is larger than
an unexpected change in foreign base growth in
the same direction should be related positively
to a change in the real exchange rate specified
as franc/foreign currency. Thus, the positive
signs in the German case are consistent with
this result while the negative sign for lagged
relative monetary surprises in the U.S. case is
not. ‘The inconsistent U.S. result, as in the
previous case, might be explained by the in-
struments and objectives argument discussed in
footnote 14. Even the German result is trouble-
some, however, in that lagged values of
monetary surprises have a significant impact on
the real exchange rate. Presumably, a surprise
should have its effect felt only in the period it
occurs but, in this case, its effects occur only
with lags of two and three months. As with the
results in Section A of the table, these results
indicate significant but unpredictable influences
of monetary actions on the real exchange rate.
CONCLUSIONS
Ten years ago, the SNB temporarily aban-
doned its monetary targets and pursued what
has been interpreted as a successful interven-
tion to reduce the Swiss franc’s real value and
restore export sector competitiveness. Although
economic theory generally suggests that such an
intervention—even when other central banks
cooperate—may have little effect on the curren-
cy’s real value, economic policy summits over
recent years often have discussed the possibility
of coordinated monetary actions to affect ex-
change rates. In this context, the Swiss ex-
perience presents an interesting case study of
monetary effects on exchange rates.
Our empirical evidence suggests that mone-
tary actions might be related significantly to
real exchange rate movements in the short run.
‘The trouble with this result is that these effects
appear to be unpredictable and not entirely
consistent with standard models of exchange
rate determination. Causality tests indicated that
changes in relative money growth rates be-
tween countries—whether actual or
unanticipated—influence the real exchange rate
for up to six months. But while short-run rela-
tionships are consistent with the conclusion that
monetary actions are not likely to have ex-
change rate effects of a size or duration that
will bring about substantial increases in exports,
the conclusions for policymakers are less clear.
‘The lack of consistency in the sign of the rela-
tionship between monetary actions and ex-
change rates across countries does not give a
clear signal as to which monetary action should
be taken to produce a given exchange rate
response.
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